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NOTES
limit damages2 9 and modify or limit the damages in their agreement.'
It is submitted, therefore, that the most rational way for the seller and
the buyer to agree on the quality risk is not by raising complicated issues
of warranties and disclaimers, but by negotiating the amount of damages
the buyer may recover. With a conscientious agreement between the
parties and a resultant clause in the written agreement, commercial sellers
and buyers can give the courts something with which to work. For the
seller it is well worth the risk of having to pay something than the risk
of having to pay everything. For the buyer it gives him an opportunity
to negotiate the risk that he may have to incur. The purchaser of consumer goods, however, is favored in modification and limitation of
remedies and damages. A limitation of consequential damages to a
purchaser of consumer goods is unconscionable and, therefore, void
under the Code.'
This limitation plus court treatment of disclaimers
of implied warranties in consumer goods thus illustrates that the current policy in sales law is to protect the consumer purchaser, and sellers
are not going to have much opportunity to limit their consumer warranty
liability.

THE GOOD FAITH PURCHASE OF GOODS AND "ENTRUSTING" TO A MERCHANT UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: SECTION 2-403
The classic problem of the good faith purchase of goods arises in a
three party situation where the seller by some misrepresentation acquires
goods from the true owner and subsequently conveys them to a buyer who
takes in good faith for value. The issue in such a situation is whether
the good faith buyer for value acquires a title that can withstand an action to recover the goods by the true owner. The Uniform Commercial
Code in section 2-403 (1), the good faith purchase of goods section, not
only (1) expands the class of protected third parties beyond the good
faith buyer for value of the Uniform Sales Act,' but (2) also radically
departs from Sales Act law in several other aspects.
Section 2-403 (2) treats the entrusting of possession of goods to a
merchant who subsequently sells to a buyer in the ordinary course of
129. See UmNFoRm CoMEcIAL
130. See UNIFORM COMMERCIA.L
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business. This section carves out an entirely new kind of protection for
buyers in the ordinary course of business,2 because at common law and
under the Sales Act the mere entrusting of possession even to a dealer
in goods of that kind did not give the dealer the power to transfer good
title.' Under section 2-403 (2), however, such a dealer has power to give
all the rights of the entruster to a buyer in the ordinary course of business.
The problems created by the differences between section 2-403 and
prior law and the language of section 2-403, irrespective of changes in
the law, will become increasingly important in Indiana. The courts will
not only meet the section under conflicts of laws principles," but must
meet it as the law of Indiana as of July 1, 1964. Therefore, a critical
analysis of section 2-403 would seem to be of great importance to commercial interests in Indiana.
SECTION

2-403 (1) OF

THE CODE

Under the Sales Act the only way for a buyer of goods to prevail
over the true owner was for him to buy from a party with voidable title
in good faith and for value, with no notice of the defect in the seller's
title.5 The Sales Act thus mirrored the general common law hesitation
to permit a seller to pass better title than he had obtained from the owner,
and only recognized those exceptions created at common law on the theory
that the seller received a voidable title from the true owner.6
The rationale of voidable title is that the true owner intends to have
title pass even though the intention is based on a fraudulent misrepresentation by the buyer. The defrauding buyer gets possession and legal title,
but his legal title is subject to the true owner's equitable remedy of rescission, as long as it is not cut off by a good faith buyer for value.' In
transactions where the seller had no intention to pass title, however,
courts have insisted that the defrauder acquired no title or so-called void
title, because the seller lacked the requisite intention.'
Good Faith Purchasesfor Value. Under the Code, section 2-403 (1)
2.
3.

See UNIFORM CoAmMERcI L CODE § 2-403, comment 2.
See VOLD, SALES 393 (2d ed. 1959); 2 WiLLISTON, SALES § 314 (rev. ed. 1948).
See also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), AGENCY § 174, comment b (1958).

4. The parties may agree that the law of either a Code state or another state shall
apply where the transaction bears a reasonable relation to both the Code state or the
other state. Without such an agreement the Code applies to any transaction bearing an
appropriate relation to a state in which the Code is enacted. UNIFORMf COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 1-105.
5.

IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-208 (Burns 1961).

6. Weber, The Extension of the Voidable Title Principle Under the Code, 49 KY.
L.J. 437, 440 (1961).
7. See 3 WILLISTON, op. cit. supr note 3, §§ 635, 636a.
8. Ibid.

NOTES
provides that one who has voidable title or who obtains goods in one of
four other specific ways has the power to transfer good title to a good
faith purclser for value. The Code drafters have modified the Sales
Act and expanded the protected class of innocent third parties beyond
buyers and, thereby, have created an interesting problem about possible
parties who might prevail against the true owner.
The Code defines purchaser as one who takes "by sale, discount,
negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other
voluntary transaction creating an interest in property";9 whereas the
Sales Act provides that a buyer is one who buys or agrees to buy or his
successor in interest.1" The initial impact of the Code's definition of
purchaser seems to make section 2-403 a section dealing with the rights
of lien creditors who attach or levy against goods in the hands of one
who has the power to transfer good title. There would seem, however,
to be two reasons why the owner's rights under section 2-403 (1) would
not be subject to the rights of a lien creditor. First, section 2-403 (4)
expressly provides that "The rights of . .

.

lien creditors are governed

by the Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9), Bulk Transfer (Article 6) and Documents of Title (Article 7)."" Secondly, the definition
of purchase in the Code mentions a series of transactions and ends with
the general limiting phrase "any other voluntary transaction creating an
interest in property."' 2 Under the canon of statutory construction
ejusdem generis where there is an enumeration of words followed by a
limiting word, the enumeration will not be given a broader meaning than
the limiting word." This means that the "lien" mentioned in section
1-201 (32) must be voluntarily created. Since "lien creditor" is defined
as a creditor who acquires a lien by attachment or levy, 4 such a creditor
does not acquire his interest by a voluntary transaction, and therefore,
there is a strong implication that section 2-403 (1) does not protect a
lien creditor."
The only other significant problem that appears to be present in the
area of a good faith purchaser for value under the Code'6 concerns the
9.

1-201(32).
IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-606(1) (Burns 1961).
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-403(4).
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(32).
2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4910 (3d ed. Horack 1943).
See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301(3).
For a complete discussion of the problems of the lien creditor see Shanker,
to the Proposed Amendment of UCC Section 2-703(3): Another View of Lien

UNIFORM,1 COMMERCIAL CODE §

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
A Reply

Creditor's Rights vs. Rights of a Seller to an Insolvent, 14 W. Rxs. L. Rav. 93 (1962).
16. At common law, courts were indefinite as to whether a buyer exercised good
faith when he was negligent in determining the extent of his seller's title. See Weber,
supra note 6, at 440. This problem, however, was settled by the Uniform Sales Act,
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definition of value. The problem is somewhat peculiar to Indiana in that
Indiana has no settled definition of value. The Sales Act provides that
value is any consideration which will support a contract including an antecedent debt or pre-existing claim.'" Ten years after the Sales Act was
adopted in Indiana, however, the Indiana Appellate Court, by looking at
pre-sales act cases, decided in Smith v. Autocar Sales & Serv. Co.'" that
one cannot be a good faith buyer for value when goods are obtained in
payment of an antecedent debt. In the absence of later case law on the
subject, the Smith case is controlling in spite of the Sales Act." Under
the Code value is defined in substantially the same way as it was defined
in the Sales Act.20 There is, therefore, a question as to whether preexisting claims will be considered to be value in satisfaction of the good
faith purchase requirement of the Code.
Fraud as to Identity. There are basically three types of identity
fraud transactions: (1) the buyer obtains the goods fraudulently under
an assumed name by dealing face to face with the owner; (2) the buyer
obtains the goods in a face to face transaction with the owner by posing
as the agent of another, when in fact he is not; (3) the buyer obtains the
goods from the owner by mail, telephone or other similar means of communication using an assumed name.2 '
The general rule at common law and under the Sales Act in the first
,type of transaction or the face to face transaction is that the defrauder
receives a voidable title subject to the equities of the owner until cut off
by a good faith buyer for value.22 The rationale is that the owner has
been induced to believe that the defrauder is solvent and that the defrauder is the person whom he pretends to be. Certainly, the owner intends to pass title to the person of good credit, but the courts say that
which defines good faith as a thing "honestly" done, whether negligently or not.

IND. ANN. STAT.

See

§ 58-606 (Burns 1961). Under the Code good faith is defined in sub-

stantially the same way as it is under the Uniform Sales Act, as honesty in fact and
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in trade. UNIFoRM

COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-103(1) (b).
17. IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-606 (Burns 1961).
18. 107 Ind. App. 244, 20 N.E.2d 188 (1939). The Uniform Sales Act was adopted
in Indiana in 1929.
19. See Note, Cancellatiom of Pre-existing Debt wt Value as to Bona Fide Purchaser in Indiana and Michigan, Contrary to Statutory Definition, 25 NOTRE DAME LAW.
117 (1949).
20. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(44) defines "value" as security for or partial satisfaction of a pre-existing claim or generally any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract.
21. See 3 WILLIsTON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 635.
22. VOLD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 378; 3 WiLLisTo r, op. cit. supra note 3, § 635;
see Dresher v. Roy Wilmeth Co., 118 Ind. App. 542, 82 N.E.2d 260 (1948).
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the owner's primary intention is to pass title to the physical person stand23
ing before him.
The rule is different in the second type of transaction, the agency
fraud transaction. Here the defrauder represents that he is the agent of
one who is solvent and has good credit, and the owner is induced to surrender possession to him. In this case, however, the defrauder gets no
title or void title and the owner can get his goods back even after a subsequent sale to a good faith buyer for value.2" The rationale is that the
defrauder can get no title, since the owner intended to pass title to a
principal and the person who is allegedly the principal, if he exists, gets
no title having never agreed to buy the goods."
In the mail or telephone transaction, the rule is like that of the
agency fraud case. The defrauder orders goods from the owner and
uses the name of a financially responsible person to induce the owner to
send the goods. The authorities indicate that the owner intends to pass
title to the person whose signature is affixed to the letter or to the person
who the owner believes the telephone speaker to be, and only secondarily
does the owner intend title to pass to the actual writer or speaker. Hence,
in this kind of transaction the defrauder gets no title and the true owner
can recover the goods even after the defrauder subsequently sells to a
good faith buyer for value.2"
The difference in these three types of identity fraud seems to be
based on an arbitrary, if not fictional analysis, of the owner's intention.
In the face to face transaction the owner's intention is woodenly said to
depend on the physical presence of the defrauder, but in mail fraud the
physical approach is abandoned, since the owner's primary intention in
this transaction is to deal with a solvent buyer. Unless the difference in
these two kinds of transactions is based on some mysterious distinction
of dealing in person, instead of by correspondence, the rationale and result in these two cases is patently inconsistent.
In the agency fraud situation, however, the same patent inconsistency is not present. Even though the defrauder takes no title in agency
fraud as opposed to voidable title in face to face fraud, the difference in
result does not depend on an inconsistent analysis of the owner's intention. The defrauder takes no title in the agency fraud transaction, because the law protected the principal or bailor by only recognizing possession in the agent or bailee; protecting the principal or bailor against
23. 3 VILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 635.
24. VOLD, op. cit. supra note 3 at 399; 3 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 635.
25. See Indianapolis Saddlery Co. v. Curry, 193 Ind. 346, 138 N.E. 337 (1923);
Alexander v. Swackhamer, 105 Ind. 81 (1886) ; Marshall v. Buber, 53 Ind. 83 (1876).
26. VOLD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 399; 3 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 635.
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an unauthorized sale. Thus, in agency fraud courts would not seem to
have to look at the owner's intention as much as at the desirability of
7
protecting ownership interests.1

There is, however, a latent inconsistency in the agency fraud situation, as opposed to the face to face fraud transaction, which would seem
also to be applicable to the mail fraud transaction. In the contemporary
economy the true owner has many devices at hand to verify the nature of
his potential customers, whereas the good faith buyer for value, as a remote party, in fact, cannot as a general rule ascertain whether his vendor
has a voidable or void title and, therefore, is given a rather uncertain
status, dependent on the intent of the true owner.
The common law identity fraud rules were not changed by section
24 of the Sales Act." Under the Code, however, the, soundness of the
common law rules in face to face fraud, mail fraud and agency fraud become relevant. In an apparent attempt to cover all of the transactions
where a buyer received voidable title at common law and, therefore,
under the Sales Act, the Code in section 2-403 (1) provides that: "A
person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good
faith purchaser for value."2 This sentence is very similar to section 24
of the Sales Act, but the section continues without mentioning voidable
title again and provides that "When goods have been delivered under a
transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though (a)
the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser. . ..

""

It is clear that in the mail-telephone and agency fraud situations
there has been an identity deception, but unfortunately section 2-403 (1)
(a) permits several possible interpretations. It can be argued that section 2-403(1) (a) is a mere restatement of the common law, the words
"voidable title" and "power" as used in section 2-403 (1) are synonomous
and therefore the good faith purchaser for value is only protected when
taking from a face to face defrauder. Secondly, it can be argued that
good faith purchasers for value are protected in a face to face fraud
transaction by the common law voidable title language in section 2403 (1). If this is so, section 2-403 (1) (a) necessarily refers to mail
27. See Ingersoll v. Emmerson, 1 Ind. 76 (1848); Kitchell v. Vanadar, 1 Blackf.

356 (Ind. 1825).
28. "Where the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto, but his title has not been
avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, provided he
buys them in good faith, for value, and without notice of the seller's defect of title."
IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-208 (Burns 1961).
There is deception as to identity in agency
fraud cases in the sense that the defrauder is not an agent, not in the sense that the
defrauder has used a name which is not his own, although this may also be true.
29. UNUORE COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-403(1).
30. Ibid.
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and agency fraud or the section is just surplusage. Finally, it could be
argued that section 2-403 (1) (a) covers all types of identity deception,
namely, face to face, mail and agency fraud.
For those who argue that the Code only codifies the common law at
least two positions can be taken. Voidable title at common law is simply
the power to pass good title to a good faith buyer. Hence when the
drafters provide that: "[a] person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value . . . [and] . . .the
purchaser has such power even though the transferor was deceived as to
the identity of the purchaser . . ."" they are using power and voidable

title to mean the same thing, since the general rule of statutory construction, when statutes are in derogation of common law principles such as
voidable title, is strict construction.12 Thus, in the absence of any clear
legislative purpose to change the common law, it can be argued that section 2-403 (1) (a) codifies prior law. These formal rules of statutory
construction, however, do not seem persuasive alone and courts tend not
to rely on them." It appears therefore, that proponents of the common
law would not carry the day relying solely on this argument.
A more persuasive argument can be based on the language of section 2-403 (1) itself. Section 2-403 (1) is limited in scope to a "transaction of purchase," and "purchase" under the Code is limited to a transaction which creates a voluntary interest in property."4 From this it can
be argued that no interest was created in the mail or agent defrauder
under prior law so that section 2-403 (1) has no effect on these two kinds
of transactions. 3 This argument, however, seems to beg the question,
since it assumes that no interest is created in the purchaser under the
Code in mail fraud and agency fraud when that is the issue in question.
The overall policy of section 2-403(1) seems to be to enlarge the
protection of the good faith purchaser. As will be indicated below, sections 2-403(1) (b), (c) and (d) extend new protection to a good faith
purchaser. If it was not the purpose of section 2-403(1) (a) to extend
protection, it would only codify existing law, and therefore unlike sections 2-403(1) (b), (c) and (d), would be unnecessary and redundant
in view of the sentence in section 2-403 (1) codifying voidable title.
Further, the Code does not specifically mention any transactions in
which a defrauder with voidable title under prior law had power to transfer good title to a good faith buyer for value. For example, a buyer who
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Ibid.
op. cit. supra note 13, § 6201.
3 SUTHRLAND, op. cit. supra note 13, § 6204.
See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201 (32).
See Weber, supra note 6.

3

SUTHELUAND,

See
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buys goods on credit while fraudulently intending not to pay, got voidable title at common law and under the Sales Act." Section 2-403 (1)
codifies this result, however, by saying a person with voidable title has
the power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value.
This being the case, there is no reason to suppose that section 2-403 (1)
(a) is only a codification of prior law. This would seem to be a particularly valid supposition in that neither section 2-403(1) (b), (c) or (d)
codify prior law.
The Code commissioners also indicate that the general purpose of
section 2-403 (1) is to extend protection of good faith purchasers "ina
number of specific situations which have been troublesome under prior
law." 7 Even though the rules regarding mail and agency fraud may not
have been "troublesome," in that they are firmly established under prior
law, they are "troublesome" in that the result varies according to the kind
of identity deception practiced. From the standpoint of the good faith
purchaser it would be less "troublesome" if his seller could pass good title
without regard to the type of identity fraud used by the seller. The
word "troublesome" is not clear as it is used by the commissioners, but
looking to other sources for the legislative purpose of section 2-403(1)
indicates that the commissioners felt that mall and agency fraud were
"troublesome" and they intended to include them with face to face fraud
in the kind of transactions which create power in the purchaser to pass
good title."8
The Code is to be liberally construed to simplify and clarify the law
of commercial transactions.3 9 The divergent results in the various types
of identity fraud are unnecessarily complex because they depend on an
36. See Curme, Dunn & Co. v. Rauh, 100 Ind. 247 (1885); Bell v. Cafferty, 21
Ind. 411 (1863). See also IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-208 (Burns 1961).
37. UNiroai CommERcIAL CODE § 2-403, comment 1.
38. If one can draw an analogy between commercial paper and the sale of goods
it is helpful to see that the commissioners do away with the face-to-face and mail
fraud distinction in commercial paper. It can be supposed that the same purpose existed
in the drafting of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-403. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
3-405, comment 2 states:
Subsection (1)(a) is new. It rejects decisions which distinguish between
face-to-face imposture and imposture by mail and holds that where parties deal
by mail the dominant intent of the drawer is to deal with the name rather than
the person so the resulting instrument may be negotiated only by indorsement
of the payee whose name has been taken in vain. The result of the distinction
has been under some prior law, to throw the loss in the mail imposture forward to a subsequent holder or to the drawee. Since the maker or the drawer
believes the two to be one and the same, the two intentions cannot be separated,
and the "dominant intent" is a fiction. The position here taken is that the loss,
regardless of the type of fraud which the particular imposter has committed,
should fall upon the maker or drawer.
39. See UIFFoRm COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(1).
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analysis of the owner's intention in each type of fraud. It would simplify
and clarify the law of commercial transactions if each kind of identity
fraud were treated in the same way so that a uniform result could be obtained in all cases of identity fraud.
Further, it can be argued that section 2-403(1) (a) covers mail and
agency fraud since commercial convenience and the free flow of goods
are maximized. In any identity fraud situation where there is no estoppel both the original seller and the good faith purchaser are free from
blame. To favor the good faith purchaser is to create a climate where
transactions are stable and where goods can be purchased freely without
fear of losing them to a prior owner. It is clear that the seller should be
able to recover from the defrauder, but caveat emptor is a heavy burden
on an innocent purchaser. Protecting the interest of the defrauded owner
must be at the expense of unhampered sales transactions in a free enterprise economy.
Finally, perhaps the risk of loss should be in the person who made
the loss possible or who could most easily have prevented the loss. In
this regard the owner is probably the proper party, since he allowed the
goods to get into the hands of the mail or agency defrauder without confirming the defrauder's identity. Of course the good faith purchaser
from the defrauder might be able to determine how his seller obtained
goods, but most remote good faith purchasers could not. Remote good
faith purchasers appear to have less opportunity to determine the defrauder's true identity than the originl seller and, yet, prior law put the
risk on the remote purchaser in agency and fail fraud cases. Therefore,
commercial convenience and the free flow of goods would seem to require section 2-403 (1) (a) to change the result of prior law; giving the
defrauder in all three types of identity fraud the power to pass good
title to a good faith purchaser for value.
Goods Obtained by Bad Check. At common law and under the Sales
Act the general rule has been that payment by a check is conditional and
that no title passes until the check is honored, upon the rationale that title
is not intended to pass until final payment is made.4" This result has
been roundly criticized 4 ' and courts will often ignore the bad check ele40. See VOLD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 172; 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 3, §
346a; Corman, Cash Sales, Worthless Checks and the Bona Fide Purchaser, 10 VAND.
L. R.Ev. 55 (1956) ; Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE
L.J. 1057, 1060 (1954); Hall, Article 2-Sales--"From Status to Contract?" 1952 Wis.
L. REv. 209, 218 (1952); Vold, Worthless Check Cash Sales, 1-2 HASTINGS L.J. 111
(1950) ; 30 N.D.L. REv. 229, 231 (1954); Note, The "Cash Sale" Presumption in Bad
Check Cases, 62 YALE L.J. 101 (1952).
41. See, e.g., 2 WmI.IsroN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 346a; Note, The "Cash Sale"
Presumption in Bad Check Cases, 62 YALE L.J. 101 (1952).
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ment42 and find for the good faith buyer where some other element such
as estoppel" or fraud4 4 is present.
Williston, however, in criticizing the result itself, argued that a seller
actually intends to transfer title in return for the check. He commented
that payment is not conditional by check in the sense that no title will
pass; the only condition is on the seller's right to get money for the
negotiable instrument and noted that under a contrary result, the buyer
by check would be a tort-feaser if he dealt with the goods as an owner
before the check dears. He concluded, therefore, that the present rule
was undesirable, because most buyers do treat the goods as their own after payment by check and most sellers, after receiving a check, probably
intend for buyers to act like the new owner.45
Another ground for criticism of the bad check rule is based on an
analysis of who can best bear the risk. The seller can, in most situations,
determine the state of buyer's account in this day of rapid communication
and, for things which could not be determined by the seller's inquiry, such
as forgery or uncleared items, the concerned seller could withhold delivery until the check is honored. For a subsequent good faith buyer for
value to protect himself, it would be necessary for him to check back up
his chain of title for bad check sales, and such a task would seem to be in
conflict with the concepts of rapid transactions and the free flow of
goods. Further, it would seem that, since normally the seller in a bad
check situation would be a merchant, the practical economics of the bad
check cases would offer the seller the best chance to shift and spread the
burden of bad check losses either to his customers through the price or by
insurance. The good faith buyer for value, as a general rule, will not
have such risk shifting and spreading opportunities, unless he is a merchant and, therefore, will as a consumer personally bear the loss under
46
the bad check-no title rule.
The Code in section 2-403 (1) (b), apparently recognizing the failings of the bad check-no title rule, changes prior law by providing that a
bad check purchaser has power to transfer good title to a good faith purchaser for value. Risk of a bad check is now placed on the original
owner, but such a risk is consistent with the Code's general policy of extending protection to the good-faith purchaser for value. The effect un42. See Rocco v. Server, 89 Ind. App. 457, 165 N.E. 335 (1929).
43. See Hoham v. Aukermann-Tuesburg Motors, 77 Ind. App. 316, 133 N.E. 507

(1922).
44. See Dresher v. Roy Wilrneth Co., 118 Ind. App. 542, 82 N.E.2d 260 (1948).
45. 2 WILLISTON, Op. cit. supra note 3, § 346a.

46. See Note, The "Cash Sale" Presumptionz in Back Check Cases, 62 YALE L.J.
101 (1952).

NOTES
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der the Code will be to increase the marketability of goods among subsequent purchasers,4" but at the same time the original seller may have to
withhold delivery or develop methods of inquiry to protect himself.
CASH SALE

At common law where the parties agreed that a sale was to be for
cash or made no mention of the terms of payment no title passed until
payment was made, since the seller presumably intended the passage of
title to depend on the payment of the price, just as he presumably did in
the bad check cases.4" Under the Sales Act,49 like common law,"0 in an
agreed on cash sale no title passes until the condition of payment is satisfied. Both common law and the Sales Act"' relied on the rules of property and where any agreement to have a cash sale was express or implied
in the conduct of the parties no title passed until payment was made; the
result being based on seller intent.
Assisted by a court created intent to retain title, the cash sale rule
was developed in a predominantly non-credit economy and has played its
most significant role in retail over the counter transactions. The Sales
Act retained the cash sale rule by its reference to common law, 2 but in
doing so failed to recognize that credit sales had gained in prevalence.
The Code, section 2-403 (1) (c) changes the common law and Sales
Act result, and provides that the purchaser has power to transfer a good
47. VOLD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 173.
48. See Curme, Dunne & Co. v. Rauh, 100 Ind. 247 (1885) ; Payne v. June, 92 Ind.
252 (1883) ; VOLD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 160; 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 342;
Corman, supra note 40; Gilmore, supra note 40, at 1060; Hall, supra note 40, at 218;
VOLD, supra note 40, at 112.
49. "Unless otherwise agreed, delivery of the goods and payment of the price are
concurrent conditions; that is to say, the seller must be ready and willing to give possession of the goods to the buyer in exchange for the price and the buyer must be ready
and willing to pay the price in exchange for possession of the goods." IND. ANN. STAT.

§ 58-302 (Burns 1961).

50. See Curme, Dunne & Co. v. Rauh, 100 Ind. 247 (1885) (dictum) ; VOLD, op. cit.
supra note 3; 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 342.
51. Where no intention about the time of payment is expressed or can be implied
the Uniform Sales Act has an elaborate set of rules for ascertaining the parties' intentions. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-203 (Burns 1961). For example, in an unconditional
contract to sell specific goods, in a deliverable state, the property in the goods passes to
the buyer when the contract is made whether or not delivery or payment are delayed.
IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-203, Rule 1 (Burns 1961). The seller in such an unconditional
contract for specific goods in a deliverable state retains a lien as long as he retains possession which can be used to insure the buyer's performance. IND. ANN. STAT. § 58402(1) (Burns 1961). As long as the seller retains possession his lien could not be cut
off if the buyer sells to a subsequent good faith purchaser for value. IND ANN. STAT. §
58-411 (Burns 1961). But if the seller surrenders possession he loses his lien and he is
not protected against a subsequent sale to a good faith purchaser. IND. ANN. STAT. §
58-405 (Burns 1961).
52. See VOLD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 160; 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 3, §
343.
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title to a good faith purchaser for value even though it was agreed that
the transaction was to be a cash sale. The section covers only those cash
sales agreed on by the parties, but the Code defines agreement as the bargain of the parties either express or implied.5" So even though there is
no express condition of payment for the passage of title, the court will
still imply a cash sale from other circumstances including course of dealing, usage of trade or course of performance. Retail across the counter
sales, therefore, would probably still impliedly be cash sales under the
Code, but where a cash sale is not expressly provided and cannot be implied, the courts will probably treat the sale as one on credit. The distinctions, however, will only be relevant for matters between the immediate seller and buyer for the good faith purchaser for value will be
protected in either the cash sale or credit transaction.
As a policy matter section 2-403(1) (c) will greatly facilitate the
free flow of trade by removing the void title restriction from a basic
sales transaction. The protection of the good faith purchaser for value,
however, is given at the expense of the original cash sale seller. Although
this may seem to be somewhat harsh, it must be remembered that generally the cash sale seller can, as the risk taking seller in the bad check
situation, withhold delivery or shift and spread the losses.
LARCENOUS FRAUD

The American rule has been that one who obtains goods by a larcenous taking cannot give good title to a good faith buyer." The rule is
simple enough, but confusion has been created because the same criminal
conduct may be called non-larcenous where the jurisdiction has a statute
covering non-larcenous fraud, or it may be called larceny where no such
statute exists and the state is interested in obtaining a criminal conviction
by some means. Confusion arises, therefore, when property notions
such as voidable title depend on the jurisdiction's statutory definition of
larcenous conducf

For example, in most states larceny by trick is based on fraud punishable as larcenous." In larceny by trick the victim gives possession,
but not title, in that he expects the goods to be returned or used for his
benefit. 6 Since the defrauder only gets void title under the Sales Act a
53. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(3).
54. See Breckenridge v. McAfee, 54 Ind. 141 (1876) ; Robinson v. Skipworth, 23
Ind. 311 (1864); Phalan, Interests of Remote Parties in Goods Under the Uniforms
Commercial Code, 59 DICK. L. REv. 332 (1955) ; Weber, supra note 6, at 464; 30 TEXAS
L. REv. 788 (1952).
55. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3001 (Burns Supp, 1962).
56. See PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW, 204 (1957).
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good faith buyer for value could not prevail as against the true owner.
The crime of obtaining property by false pretenses, 7 however, is not considered larcenous in Indiana,"s since in obtaining property by false pretenses the owner's intent is to give both possession and title in reliance
on the defendant's false representations." Other jurisdictions, however,
have treated obtaining property by false pretenses as larceny,"0 with the
resultant effect that the good faith buyer for value could not rely on
voidable title, which presumably would be available in Indiana under the
Sales Act in the same fact situation.
Section 2-403(1) (d) of the Code creates power to transfer good
title to a good faith purchaser in one who procures delivery by fraud
punishable as larcenous under the criminal law. In Indiana the defrauder
had such power on obtaining property by false pretenses, but not in larceny by trick."' The relevant question, therefore, is whether section
2-403(1) (d) would allow the good faith purchaser for value to prevail
in a larceny by trick situation.
The Code commissioners have commented that the power to pass
good title to a good faith purchaser is
freed from any technicalities depending upon the extended law
of larceny; such extension of the concept of theft to include
trick, particular types of fraud, and the like is for the purpose
of helping conviction of the offenders; it has no proper application to the long standing policy of civil protection of buyers
from persons guilty of such trick or fraud.62
Even in light of the Code purpose, however, it has been argued that section 2-403 (1) (d) could not cover larceny by trick, because in larceny by
trick the goods are not delivered to the thief under "a transaction of
purchase" as required by section 2-403 (1). This type of criticism, however, seems to beg the question, since it answers the question of whether
larceny by trick is a "transaction of purchase" by prior law, rather than
as it should be answered, in reference to Code law. "Purchase" is
broadly defined under the Code "as any . . . voluntary transaction cre-

ating an interest in property.""8
57. See
58. See
165 Ind. 472,
59. See
60. See

Certainly the transfer of possession in

IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2103 (Bums 1956).

Johnson v. State, 222 Ind. 473, 54 N.E.2d 273 (1943) ; Williams v. State,
75 N.E. 875 (1905) ; Perkins v. State, 65 Ind. 317 (1879).
PERKINS, op. cit. supra note 56, at 204.
Weber, The Extension of the Voidable Title Principle Under the Code, 49

Ky. L.J. 437, 464 (1961).
61.
62.
63.

See Rocco v. Server, 89 Ind. App. 457, 165 N.E. 335 (1929).
2-403, comment 2.
1-201(32).
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larceny by trick is voluntary and it might well be argued that possession
is an interest in property under the Code. Possession as an interest in
property is also supported by the mail fraud, agency fraud, bad check and
cash sale provisions of section 2-403 (1) of the Code, since although a
sale transaction may have been the ultimate goal in such cases, the rationale under the prior law was that the defrauder only obtained possession of the goods. To argue, therefore, that possession would be insufficient to meet the "transaction of purchase" would seem to make
sections 2-403(1) (a), (b), (c) and (d) mere surplusage, with the resultant effect of making section 2-403 (1) a mere codification of prior
law.
The policy behind section 2-403 (1) (d) as in the other subsections
is to extend protection to good faith purchasers, which of course, improves the free flow of goods. It may seem, however, a heavy burden to
put on the defrauded owner, since the owner who loses his goods to a
criminal defrauder is simply out of luck if the goods are resold. Such a
dim view is probably based on the idea that a victim should not bear the
loss of a crime committed against him. The more realistic view is to
consider larcenous fraud as fraud which in civil actions prior to the Code
often gave the defrauder voidable title and consider irrelevant the fact
that the fraud is also punishable as larceny, since its ultimate purpose is
to obtain a criminal conviction.
SECTION

2-403 (2)

The rule was well settled at common law and maintained under the
Sales Act, that a bailee could not give any title to a good faith buyer of
bailed goods.6" Bare possession in the bailee would not estop the bailor
from asserting title as against a subsequent innocent party." It was also
established that when possession was given to one who dealt in goods of
the same kind, that the dealer had no power to give good titile to a good
faith buyer.6 6 For example, when a watch was taken for repair to a
jeweler who sold and repaired watches the jeweler had no power to give
good title to a good faith buyer for value.6"

Indiana even went as far

64. See Ingersoll v. Emmerson, 1 Ind. 76 (1848); Kitchell v. Vanadar, 1 Blackf.
356 (Ind. 1825). "Where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and
who does not sell them under the authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer

acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had unless the owner of the goods is
by his conduct precluded from denying the seller's authority to sell." IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 58-207 (Burns 1961).
65. See VOLD, SALES, 393 (2d ed. 1959) ; 2 WInLsTON, SALES § 313 (rev. ed. 1948).
66. See VOLD, op. cit. supra note 65, at 393; 2 WInLISTON, op. cit. supra note 65. §
314.
67. See 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 65, § 314; Stockton, Sales Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Significant Changes, 20 ALA. LAw. 352, 365 (1959).
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as to hold that possession given to a used car dealer to sell the owner's car
for a certain amount does not give the dealer the power to give good title
to a good faith buyer when the car is sold for considerbly less than the
agreed amount. 8
While mere possession was not enough, a subsequent good faith
buyer for value could prevail over the true owner if the possessor of the
goods also had indicia of ownership. The most common way of giving
indicia of title in Indiana has been to give conditional vendee or a chattel
mortgagor possession of an automobile along with a certificate of title
which does not show any lien.69 The lien holder having neglected to have
his lien recorded on the certificate is estopped from denying the title of
subsequent good faith buyers.7" Another estoppel example has been
when the possessor is said to have indicia of title because the owner made
or allowed to be made oral statements inconsistent with his ownership. A
good faith buyer can in these circumstances rely on the possessor's apparent title.7 '
With the rather limited protection given the subsequent third party
under prior law, it therefore seems at first glance, that a rather radical
extension of protection has been given third parties by section 2-403 (2).
The protection, however, is rather specialized since the section provides
that only the "entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals
in goods of that kind gives [such a merchant the] power to transfer all
rights of the entruster to a buyer in the ordinary course of business."72
68. Stults v. Miltenberger, 176 Ind. 561, 96 N.E. 581 (1911). Compare Annot., 36
A.L.R.2d 1362 (1954). (This annotation indicates that one who entrusts goods to an
auctioneer will be estopped from denying the title of a good faith purchaser from the
auctioneer.)
69. See Associates Inv. Co. v. Shelton, 122 Ind. App. 384, 105 N.E.2d 354 (1951);
Nichols v. Bogda Motors, 118 Ind. App. 156, 77 N.E.2d 905 (1948). See the following
cases in which Indiana has used the certificate of title as the basis for estoppel, Champa
v. Consolidated Fin. Corp., 231 Ind. 580, 110 N.E.2d 289 (1953) (Mechanic is estopped
from asserting his mechanic's lien where he failed to examine his customer's certificate
of title which would have shown the outstanding lien of the conditional seller) ; Dresher
v. Roy Wilmeth Co., 118 Ind. App. 542, 82 N.E.2d 260 (1948) (The seller who sold for
a bad check made a subsequent sale to a good faith purchaser possible when he could
have protected himself by retaining the certificate of title until the check was honored) ;
Guaranty Discount Corp. v. Bowers, 94 Ind. App. 373, 158 N.E. 231 (1927) (The lender
took a dealer's note and a conditional sales contract but did not ask for the certificate
of title. The lender was estopped from asserting its interest when the dealer subsequently sold the car to another innocent purchaser.) See Note, 25 IND. L.J. 337 (1950);

3 IND. L.J. 401 (1928).
70. See Corman, supra note 40, at 64; Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 816 (1951).
71. See 2 WIUsToN, op. cit. supra note 65, § 316.
72. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-403(2). Under the Code: "Entrusting" in-

cludes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of possession regardless of any
condition expressed between the parties to the delivery or acquiescence and regardless

of whether the procurement of the entrusting or the possessor's disposition of the goods
have been such as to be larcenous under the criminal law. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
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The specialized protection of section 2-403 (2) can probably be best
illustrated by contrasting it with section 2-403(1), the good faith purchase section of the Code. While under section 2-403 (1) the good faith
purchaser's transferor must only take the goods from the true owner in
a particular manner, under section 2-403(2) the transferor must be a
merchant dealing in goods of the kind transferred, the pawnbroker not
qualifying as such a merchant." Also, under section 2-403 (1) the third
party need only qualify as a good faith purchaser for value, whereas
under section 2-403 (2) the third party must be "a person who in good
faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of ownership rights or security interest .

.

.

[and] . .

.

buys in the ordinary

course from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind. .
While section 2-403 (2) is not radical in the sense that it protects a
very limited group of third parties, it is as a policy matter the most extreme protection given to a purchaser by section 2-403. It very nearly
expresses the notion of market overt since the buyer in the ordinary
course of business does not have to be concerned about the possibility of
having goods reclaimed by the true owner. The buyer in the ordinary
course will get all the dealer's interest and all the entruster's interest."
The Code commissioners indicate that section 2-403 (2) will not interfere where the purchaser had rights under agency law, estoppel or
indicia of ownership," indicating that as to non-dealer entrustments, prior
law will still apply and that something more than mere possession will be
necessary for a third party to prevail as against the true owner. In Indiana this would mean that the possessor with a clear certificate of title
still has indicia of title which will prevent the owner from asserting his
own title against a subsequent innocent purchaser.
Aside from policy consideration, certain language in section 2403 (2) creates construction difficulty which courts must some day face.
The section says that the entrustee must be a dealer dealing in "goods of
that kind." "Goods of that kind" could raise questions of quality, i.e., can
§ 2-403(3). This definition includes several security arrangements, ageny relationships
and bailments under present law. See HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES (UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE) 106 (1958).
"The rights of other purchasers of goods
and of lien creditors are governed by the Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9),
Bulk Transfers (Article 6) and Documents of Title (Article 7)." UNIFORM COMn.MiERCIAL CODE § 2-403 (4).
73. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(9).
74. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(9).
75. See Hall, supra note 40, at 219; Hawkland, Curing an Inproper Tender of Title

to Chattels: Past, Present and Commercial Code, 46

MINN.

L. REv. 697, 719 (1962) ;

Whiteside, Uniform Commercial Code-Major Changes in Sales Law, 49 Ky. L.J. 165,
186 (1960); 30 N.D.L. REv. 229, 230 (1953).
76. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-403, comment 1.
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a dealer who sells the same type of goods but of lesser or greater quality
than the entrusted goods pass title to a buyer in the ordinary course of
business. Quality distinctions of this sort could of course lead a court
into impossible inquiries as to how much alike the entrusted goods and
the dealer's inventory must be. Courts, therefore, will probably resolve
this difficulty by saying the goods must be substantially alike, ultimately
leaving it as a question of fact for the jury.
"Goods of that kind" also raises a question with a more ultimate
impact in determining the scope of section 2-403(2), namely, must the
goods dealt in and entrusted be both new or both used. Consider the
watch repairman who sells new watches. Can he sell a used watch
brought in for repairs? The only hint that the Code gives as to the
resolution of this difficulty appears to be the requirement that the "buyer
in the ordinary course of business" be in "good faith,"' since the buyer
would appear to have a proportionately greater difficulty in establishing
his "good faith" as it became increasingly apparent that the merchant
dealt exclusively in new or used goods.
Further, section 2-403(2) requires the seller to be a merchant who
"deals in" goods of that kind. Could "deals in" mean one who rents
goods as well as one who sells? For example, could a party who has a
rent-all and repair business give title to a chattel taken in for repair
simply becauce he rents goods of this type?" It seems that the draftsmen intended to cover sellers when the words "deals in" were used, since
the Code commissioners commented that section 2-403(2) to (4) was
intended to protect buyers who buy in the ordinary course out of inventory.7" The Code also defines a buyer in the ordinary course as one
who buys from one who "sells" goods of that kind."0 Therefore, it can
be concluded that one who buys goods from a dealer who "rents" goods
of that kind could not be a buyer in the ordinary course and would not
come under the protection of section 2-403 (2). It is unfortunate that
section 2-403 (2) uses a broad language like "deals in" when the definition of a buyer in the ordinary course is limited as previously indicated,
since an unnecessary uncertainty is created.
In one respect section 2-403 (2) seems unduly harsh on the entruster,
and subject to criticism. The section makes no distinction between (1)
77. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(9).
78. Looking to the Code's definition of "merchant" to discover the meaning of
dealer does not help because UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-104(1) provides that a
merchant is a person who deals in goods of the kind. This leads to a vicious circle,
since a merchant is a dealer and a dealer seems to be a merchant.

79.
80.
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the entruster who should have known or did know that the entrustee had
the requisites to transfer under section 2-403(2) and (2) the entruster
who had no such knowledge. It seems eminently unfair to place the risk
of loss on the entruster when the fact that the entrustee is a dealer is not
apparent to the entruster. Suppose the entrustee has a garage for repairing vehicles and across town he also has a used car lot. Through no
fault of the entruster, the absolute language of section 2-403(2) places
the loss on the entruster if the entrustee sells to a buyer in the ordinary
course of business. On the other hand, suppose the garage manager is
an independent contractor and suppose it appears to the owner that the
garage and a used car lot next door are operated by the same people.
Under these circumstances the garage manager could not sell the owner's
car and give good title because he is not a "merchant who deals in goods
of that kind" with the meaning of section 2-403 (2). Here the entruster
is protected from his own indiscretion.
While it might be contended that a court recognizing the severity of
the absolute burden of risk on the entruster, could read a standard of
reasonable care into section 2-403 (2), it would seem that to judicially
reach such a result would go far beyond the acceptable bounds of statutory construction in light of the plain meaning of the section. The only
acceptable remedy to the problem, should it be felt necessary, would seem
to be a legislative amendment to section 2-403 (2) to provide that "[a] ny
entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant . . . [by one who knows
or has reason to know that the merchant] . .
deals in goods of that

kind gives him the power to transfer all rights to the entruster to a buyer
in the ordinary course of business."
Section 2-403 (2) strikes at the very heart of common law bailment
and agency relationships and may well cause the fly-by-night retail establishments with repair departments to become a thing of the past since
reasonable owners will refuse to entrust goods where they may be divested of their interest in them. Of course, established retail merchants
will continue to repair goods, because owners know if their goods are
sold and cannot be recovered, they will still have a worth while conversion action against the merchant. Perhaps determination by an entruster of whether his entrustee is a merchant who deals in goods of the
kind entrusted, is reputable and is solvent is burdensome. Caveat emptor,
however, has been a harsh standard and would seem much more inconsistent with contemporary marketability of goods concepts than section
2-403 (2) and its protection for the buyer in the ordinary course of business.

